Boeing 737 Max
POSTED BY: SIGNYM
UPDATED: Friday, August 21, 2026 17:40
VIEWED: 21693
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All of these assinine Libtard Boeing Executives should be thrown in prison. These Libtards are disgusting pigs.
Cut and paste didn't work well here, maybe somebody else can try.
I know there are other sources of this story, but I haven't tracked them down.
Boeing VP Executive has wedding with all of his Ultra-Libtard pals (they were all in the Obamination Admin), and they start fights, including the ugly Libtard women, and the Best Man gets arrested by cops.
https://www.bizpacreview.com/2019/12/17/pro-trump-womens-group-say-the
y-were-attacked-at-dc-hotel-by-well-connected-dem-wedding-party-865632
Unfortunately, due to the harassment from Trump haters from an adjacent ball room, and lack of hotel security involvement, an event occurred when myself and others were escorting WFAF women out of the venue. I’m ok, but the future of this country is not!
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@JGilliam_SEAL
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Unfortunately, due to the harassment from Trump haters from an adjacent ball room, and lack of hotel security involvement, an event occurred when myself and others were escorting WFAF women out of the venue. I’m ok, but the future of this country is not!
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Ann Vandersteel SteelTruth™? @annvandersteel
Replying to @annvandersteel
This picture is from the wedding where the deranged TDS afflicted guests emerged harassing MAGA women, assaulted a former Navy Seal, FBI agent and US Federal Air Marshall @JGilliam_SEAL The man in the red tie drinking a beer was arrested. @realDonaldTrump @fbi @SecretService
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The grunts usually know what's going on ...
Quote:MORE AT https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/plane-was-designed-clowns-shocking-b
"This Plane Was Designed By Clowns, Who Are Supervised By Monkeys [FAA]" - Shocking Boeing Emails Reveal Contempt For Management, FAA
...According to more than 100 pages of internal company communications (which were apparently withheld from the FAA during the certification process for the jet) Boeing employees could be heard mocking federal rules, openly discussing their deception of regulators, and joking about the MAX's potential flaws.
The most shocking messages were sent by Boeing pilots and other employees who can be seen discussing software issues and problems with the flight simulator software for the MAX, which is particularly disturbing since it was issues with the plane's MCAS software that were found to have contributed to two avoidable crashes and the brutal deaths of 346 people
In one message, one Boeing employee openly admits to deceiving the FAA on behalf of the company.
"I still haven’t been forgiven by God for the covering up I did last year," one of the employees said in messages from 2018, apparently in reference to interactions with the Federal Aviation Administration.
In another, a group of Boeing test pilots agreed that they wouldn't want their families flying with pilots trained on the new Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight simulator.
"Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn’t," one employee said to a colleague in another exchange from 2018, before the first crash. "No," the colleague responded.
As the New York Times explains, the release of these communications, both emails and instant messages, is "the latest embarrassing episode for Boeing in a crisis that has cost the company billions of dollars and wreaked havoc on the aviation industry across the globe."
It should go without saying that these messages "threaten to complicate Boeing's relationship with the FAA" at a time when it's still unclear when the MAX might be cleared to fly again.
Yet, as we mentioned above, this is only the latest and perhaps most jarring of a string of revelations citing internal documents and communications. Forget "regulatory capture" - a term that's often used to criticize the revolving-door nature of Wall Street compliance officials and the regulatory agencies supposed to keep their firms in line - this is regulatory irrelevance.
oeing-emails-reveal-contempt-management-faa
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Pity would be no more,
If we did not MAKE men poor - William Blake
Happy New Year, WISHY. I edited out your psychopathic screed!
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Quote:I can tell you that some in the airline or aircraft industry have trouble sleeping at night, knowing how many lives are in danger. And some do not have ny trouble sleeping at night - they just tell their family members and significant others to not fly certain planes. I expect these in your article have no problem sleeping at night, knowing these hundreds of people died as a result of their deceptions.
Originally posted by SIGNYM:
The grunts usually know what's going on ...Quote:MORE AT https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/plane-was-designed-clowns-shocking-b
"This Plane Was Designed By Clowns, Who Are Supervised By Monkeys [FAA]" - Shocking Boeing Emails Reveal Contempt For Management, FAA
...According to more than 100 pages of internal company communications (which were apparently withheld from the FAA during the certification process for the jet) Boeing employees could be heard mocking federal rules, openly discussing their deception of regulators, and joking about the MAX's potential flaws.
The most shocking messages were sent by Boeing pilots and other employees who can be seen discussing software issues and problems with the flight simulator software for the MAX, which is particularly disturbing since it was issues with the plane's MCAS software that were found to have contributed to two avoidable crashes and the brutal deaths of 346 people
In one message, one Boeing employee openly admits to deceiving the FAA on behalf of the company.
"I still haven’t been forgiven by God for the covering up I did last year," one of the employees said in messages from 2018, apparently in reference to interactions with the Federal Aviation Administration.
In another, a group of Boeing test pilots agreed that they wouldn't want their families flying with pilots trained on the new Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight simulator.
"Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn’t," one employee said to a colleague in another exchange from 2018, before the first crash. "No," the colleague responded.
As the New York Times explains, the release of these communications, both emails and instant messages, is "the latest embarrassing episode for Boeing in a crisis that has cost the company billions of dollars and wreaked havoc on the aviation industry across the globe."
It should go without saying that these messages "threaten to complicate Boeing's relationship with the FAA" at a time when it's still unclear when the MAX might be cleared to fly again.
Yet, as we mentioned above, this is only the latest and perhaps most jarring of a string of revelations citing internal documents and communications. Forget "regulatory capture" - a term that's often used to criticize the revolving-door nature of Wall Street compliance officials and the regulatory agencies supposed to keep their firms in line - this is regulatory irrelevance.
oeing-emails-reveal-contempt-management-faa
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Now Execs are leaving before they get sent to prison.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-new-ceo-1.5425407?cmp=rss
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Quote:There are hundreds of engineers who knew what was wrong with the 737 MAX, but none of them went to the FAA to stop Boeing. It is just the way Americans are -- born with a backbone, but fear of being fired causes them to lose it, becoming cowards.
Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:
Now Execs are leaving before they get sent to prison.
http://fireflyfans.net/mthread.aspx?bid=18&tid=62996&mid=10769
35#1076935
The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at www.mediafire.com/folder/1uwh75oa407q8/Firefly
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How Boeing’s Responsibility in a Deadly Crash ‘Got Buried’
Jan. 20, 2020, 6:00 a.m. ET
After a Boeing 737 NG crashed near Amsterdam more than a decade ago, the Dutch investigators focused blame on the pilots for failing to react properly when an automated system malfunctioned and caused the plane to plummet into a field, killing nine people.
Some of the parallels between that accident and the more recent ones are particularly noteworthy. Boeing’s design decisions on both the 737 Max and the plane involved in the 2009 crash — the 737 NG, or Next Generation — allowed a powerful computer command to be triggered by a single faulty sensor, even though each plane was equipped with two sensors. In the two 737 Max accidents, a sensor measuring the plane’s angle to the wind prompted a flight control computer to push its nose down after takeoff; on the 737 NG accident, an altitude sensor caused a different computer to cut the plane’s speed just before landing.
Dutch investigators determined that the cause of the malfunction was a sensor on the plane’s exterior measuring altitude. The sensor had mistakenly indicated that the plane was just moments from touchdown, prompting the computer to idle the engines at about 450 feet. Immediately, one of the pilots pushed the thrust lever forward to gain speed, but when he let go, the computer again commanded it to idle.
The captain intervened, disabling the autothrottle and setting the thrust levers to their maximum. Nine seconds had elapsed since the stall warning. By then, it was too late.
Decisions by Boeing, including risky design choices and faulty safety assessments, contributed to the 737 NG accident. But the Dutch Safety Board either excluded or played down criticisms of the manufacturer in its final report after pushback from a team of Americans that included Boeing and federal safety officials, documents and interviews show.
. . . the Dutch board deleted or amended findings in its own accident report about issues with the plane when the American team weighed in. The board also inserted statements, some nearly verbatim and without attribution, written by the Americans, who said that certain pilot errors had not been “properly emphasized.”
The muted criticism of Boeing after the 2009 accident fits within a broader pattern, brought to light since the Max tragedies, of the company benefiting from a light-touch approach by safety officials.
More at www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/business/boeing-737-accidents.html
The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at www.mediafire.com/folder/1uwh75oa407q8/Firefly
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Coronavirus means airlines don’t need those grounded Boeing 737 Maxes after all
Airlines are finding themselves with too many airplanes, relative to consumer demand.
No airline would have chosen what happened with the Max, of course, both in terms of the tragedies themselves and the extremely expensive grounding that has followed. But given the reduction in consumer demand, some carriers may see the situation as a silver lining—albeit a slim one. “If you’re United, it’s not such a bad thing that the Maxes haven’t yet been delivered,” says Kaplan. “It’s kind of a blessing in disguise not to be paying for those additional five, 10, 20, 30 airplanes, depending on the airline.” In addition to its 14 grounded Maxes, United had more than 100 on order.
And though airlines don’t need as many airplanes today, the situation may be totally different in just a few short months. Either way, for the first time in a while, Boeing isn’t the greatest problem plaguing the industry.
https://qz.com/1813657/coronavirus-reduces-the-impact-of-grounded-boei
ng-737-maxes/
The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at www.mediafire.com/folder/1uwh75oa407q8/Firefly
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I believe today is the 1st anniversary of the 2nd crash.
Full report supposed to come out Tuesday.
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How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer
Everyone in the aviation community wants an airplane that flies as simply and as naturally as possible. That means that conditions should not change markedly, there should be no significant roll, no significant pitch change, no nothing when the pilot is adding power, lowering the flaps, or extending the landing gear.
The airframe, the hardware, should get it right the first time and not need a lot of added bells and whistles to fly predictably. This has been an aviation canon from the day the Wright brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk.
Apparently the 737 Max pitched up a bit too much for comfort on power application as well as at already-high angles of attack. It violated that most ancient of aviation canons and probably violated the certification criteria of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. But instead of going back to the drawing board and getting the airframe hardware right, Boeing relied on something called the “Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System,” or MCAS.
Boeing’s solution to its hardware problem was software.
MCAS is certainly much less expensive than extensively modifying the airframe to accommodate the larger engines. Such an airframe modification would have meant things like longer landing gear (which might not then fit in the fuselage when retracted), more wing dihedral (upward bend), and so forth. All of those hardware changes would be horribly expensive.
What’s worse, those changes could be extensive enough to require not only that the FAA recertify the 737 but that Boeing build an entirely new aircraft. Now we’re talking real money, both for the manufacturer as well as the manufacturer’s customers.
That’s because the major selling point of the 737 Max is that it is just a 737, and any pilot who has flown other 737s can fly a 737 Max without expensive training, without recertification, without another type of rating. Airlines—Southwest is a prominent example—tend to go for one “standard” airplane. They want to have one airplane that all their pilots can fly because that makes both pilots and airplanes fungible, maximizing flexibility and minimizing costs.
It all comes down to money, and in this case, MCAS was the way for both Boeing and its customers to keep the money flowing in the right direction. The necessity to insist that the 737 Max was no different in flying characteristics, no different in systems, from any other 737 was the key to the 737 Max’s fleet fungibility. That’s probably also the reason why the documentation about the MCAS system was kept on the down-low.
Put in a change with too much visibility, particularly a change to the aircraft’s operating handbook or to pilot training, and someone—probably a pilot—would have piped up and said, “Hey. This doesn’t look like a 737 anymore.” And then the money would flow the wrong way.
More at https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-di
saster-looks-to-a-software-developer
The final paragraph in the story: It is likely that MCAS, originally added in the spirit of increasing safety, has now killed more people than it could have ever saved. It doesn’t need to be “fixed” with more complexity, more software. It needs to be removed altogether.
The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at www.mediafire.com/folder/1uwh75oa407q8/Firefly
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