Boeing 737 Max
POSTED BY: SIGNYM
UPDATED: Friday, August 21, 2026 17:40
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Boeing 737 Crashes In China With 132 People Onboard
https://www.baystreet.ca/articles/stockstowatch/75684/Boeing-737-Crash
es-In-China-With-132-People-Onboard
China Eastern Airlines Boeing 737 crash: Flight MU5735 crash - Boeing 737 model accident timeline
https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-60821189
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Quote:The crash was a Boeing 737-800, not a 737 MAX.
Originally posted by JAYNEZTOWN:
Boeing 737 Crashes In China With 132 People Onboard
https://www.baystreet.ca/articles/stockstowatch/75684/Boeing-737-Crash
es-In-China-With-132-People-Onboard
China Eastern Airlines Boeing 737 crash: Flight MU5735 crash - Boeing 737 model accident timeline
https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-60821189
https://twitter.com/flightradar24/status/1505863117343014916
The industry keeps track of "hull-losses", which sounds so much better than crashes/explosions/fires/midair collisions/being hit by antiaircraft missiles/suicidal-pilot-kills-self-and-passengers/whatevers for the 737.
Hull-losses: 225
4796 fatalities
https://aviation-safety.net/database/types/Boeing-737-series/index
This latest "hull-loss" is already in database:
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20220321-0
The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two
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Quote:That's weird. Flight does rapid descent, brief recovery, and final rapid descent in the same location and same altitude as the same Flight Number the day before. But the prior day the pilots were able to recover. Unclear if it was the same bird (hull number).
Originally posted by second:Quote:The crash was a Boeing 737-800, not a 737 MAX.
Originally posted by JAYNEZTOWN:
Boeing 737 Crashes In China With 132 People Onboard
https://www.baystreet.ca/articles/stockstowatch/75684/Boeing-737-Crash
es-In-China-With-132-People-Onboard
China Eastern Airlines Boeing 737 crash: Flight MU5735 crash - Boeing 737 model accident timeline
https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-60821189
https://twitter.com/flightradar24/status/1505863117343014916
The industry keeps track of "hull-losses", which sounds so much better than crashes/explosions/fires/midair collisions/being hit by antiaircraft missiles/suicidal-pilot-kills-self-and-passengers/whatevers for the 737.
Hull-losses: 225
4796 fatalities
https://aviation-safety.net/database/types/Boeing-737-series/index
This latest "hull-loss" is already in database:
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20220321-0
Impacted in a mountain range. Loss of altitude started 1 hour 5 minutes into flight.
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Boeing pilot who tested 737 MAX jets is found not guilty of 'deceiving safety regulators and giving incomplete information' about flight-control system that caused two deadly crashes
A federal district court jury in Fort Worth deliberated less than two hours before finding Mark Forkner, 49, not guilty on four counts of wire fraud.
Prosecutors accused Forkner of misleading Federal Aviation Administration regulators about the amount of training pilots would need to fly the Max
The FAA required only brief computer-based training for pilots instead of more extensive practice in simulators that could have cost Boeing up to $1million per plane sold.
Defense lawyers said Boeing engineers did not tell Forkner about changes to the flight software, known by its acronym, MCAS
The lawyers said Forkner was a scapegoat for Boeing and FAA officials who sought to avoid blame after the Max crashes, which killed 346 people
Justice Department spokesman Joshua Stueve said the department stands by its investigation and prosecution of the case
More at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10645881/U-S-jury-finds-forme
r-Boeing-737-MAX-pilot-not-guilty-fraud-case.html
The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two
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Why was the trial in Fort Worth?
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Quote:Because the defendant lives in Keller, TX, a suburb of Fort Worth, according to Fort Worth Star-Telegram. Since he was charged with "wire-fraud", I presume he sent those emails that got him into trouble from his home in Keller.
Originally posted by JEWELSTAITEFAN:
Why was the trial in Fort Worth?
He could have dodged the whole legal issue and avoided a trial if only he had sent his written answers to his bosses at Boeing and they would later forward his misrepresentations, also known as lies, to the people that chief pilot Mark Forkner was misleading or lying to. Pilot Forkner could then blame his bosses and his bosses could blame Forkner and the prosecutors would have nobody to prosecute because typical juries can't understand who is lying, either the bosses or Forkner. Then the innocent-until-proven-guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt defense gambit gets everyone declared innocent.
With stupid juries, that gambit works every single time when the defense attorneys are good enough to sell nonsense to dumb juries. Prosecutors know that crappy closing statement succeeds with the kind of dummies that show up for jury duty. But in this particular case, the prosecutors hoped that since the chief pilot sent the emails directly to the people he was trying to bamboozle, the jury wouldn't get confused about who to blame, but jury still did, anyway.
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/aviation/article259574139.
html
The Joss Whedon script for Serenity, where Wash lives, is Serenity-190pages.pdf at https://www.mediafire.com/two
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Oh Boeing, Boeing, Boeing ....what ARE you doing???
Quote:
FAA grounds more than 170 Boeing 737 Max 9s after section of Alaska Airlines plane blows out
The Federal Aviation Administration on Saturday ordered a temporary grounding of dozens of Boeing 737 Max 9 aircraft for inspections, a day after a piece of the aircraft blew out in the middle of an Alaska Airlines flight....
The section of the fuselage missing appeared to correspond to an exit not used by Alaska Airlines, or other carriers that don't have high-density seating configurations, and was plugged....
The incident was described as "an explosive decompression at the window exit," according to Sara Nelson, president of the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA...
The Boeing 737 Max 9 is a larger version of Boeing's best-selling jetliner, the 737 Max 8. ... The Boeing 737 Max 9 has an emergency exit door cut behind the wings for use in dense seating cabin configurations, like those used by budget airlines, according to Flightradar24.
"The doors are not activated on Alaska Airlines aircraft and are permanently 'plugged,'" Flightradar24 said.
Boeing didn't comment beyond its statement when asked about the sealed emergency exit door. Spirit AeroSystems , which makes the fuselages for the 737 Max, confirmed to CNBC that it installed the plugged door on the aircraft...
Late last year, Boeing urged airlines to inspect aircraft for a "possible" loose bolt in the rudder control system, the latest in a series of manufacturing flaws on Boeing jets
https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/06/boeing-737-max-9-grounding-after-alask
a-airlines-door-blows-midflight.html
Quote:
The new Boeing 737 Max 9 involved in the incident was delivered to Alaska Airlines in late October and certified in early November, according to FAA data. It had been in service for just eight weeks.
The Max is Boeing’s newest version of the 737 and went into service in May 2017.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/7/boeing-18
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"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal." - Henry Kissinger
Loving America is like loving an addicted spouse - SIGNYM
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The USA has started losing an ability, this is more than just 'Boeing'
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Well, I looked up Spirit Aerosystems. And unless I do a deep dive, which I don't have time for, I couldn't learn much from their website except that they have "facilities" in the USA, Malaysia, and Morocco.
And I would bet dollars to donuts that corporate HQ is in America but fabrication is someplace cheap and far away, where it's impossible to QA properly. And I would say that's typical of many American companies, even high tech ones. Our lab principally bought GC and GC MSs from Agilent (formerly Hewitt Packard) and we could tell which ones were made in China and which were made in America bc the serial numbers either began with a "C" or a "U". And every single GC MS (costing about $130,000 each) that came from China had a SIGNIFICANT flaw. Two were shipped with defective flow controllers (We spent a few weeks troubleshooting that) and one arrived so dirty it took three weeks to bake it out.
Quality control ain't what it used to be!
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"It may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal." - Henry Kissinger
Loving America is like loving an addicted spouse - SIGNYM
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Quote:You handle that by inspecting the product while the subcontractor makes it. If you wait until the product is in its final form before inspecting, you will never get better than whatever the lackadaisical subcontractor feels is good enough, even if it is no good at all.
Originally posted by SIGNYM:
Quality control ain't what it used to be!
What’s Gone Wrong at Boeing
By James Surowiecki | January 15, 2024, 7 AM ET
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/01/boeing-737-max-corpo
rate-culture/677120/
Behind the 737 Max’s persistent problems is the erosion of a valuable corporate culture. That will be harder to fix than a loose bolt.
When, last week, a panel called a door plug blew off a Boeing 737 Max 9 plane in mid-flight, leaving a gaping hole in the plane’s fuselage, air travelers everywhere no doubt felt a shudder of horror—even though the aircraft was able to turn around and land safely. But in a sense, the startling thing was how unstartling the news was. In the six years since the Max—an updated version of the long-running 737, Boeing’s most popular plane—made its debut, the aircraft has been plagued by quality problems. The most dramatic of these resulted in two catastrophic crashes, in 2018 and in 2019, which together killed 346 people.
Those crashes, caused by a faulty flight-control system, led to the Max being grounded for almost two years. Even after it returned to service, additional issues cropped up. Last April, deliveries of the Max 8 version of the plane were delayed because of problems with one of Boeing’s key suppliers’ installation of brackets joining the rear of the fuselage to the plane’s tail fin. A few months later, Boeing said it had identified a new concern, over improperly drilled holes on a bulkhead. Then, in December, the Federal Aviation Administration said an overseas airline had found that a bolt on the plane’s rudder-control system was missing a nut—a seemingly elementary fault that now chimes with the door-plug incident, which has led to the grounding of Max 9s: Both Alaska Airlines and United Airlines said that they subsequently discovered loose bolts in some of their aircraft.
Boeing was once among the most respected American companies. It helped NASA put a man on the moon. It built the 747, the most famous passenger airplane of all time. The firm’s reputation for safety and excellence was such that people used to say, “If it’s not Boeing, I’m not going”—and actually mean it. So what went wrong?
The answer that pretty much everyone arrived at after those two fatal crashes was the same: Boeing’s culture had changed. And here, the conventional wisdom is correct. For most of its history, Boeing had what you might call an engineering-centric culture, with power in the company resting in the hands of engineering and design. But in 1997, Boeing bought another aircraft manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas, in what turned out to be a kind of reverse acquisition—executives from McDonnell Douglas ended up dominating and remaking Boeing. They turned it from a company that was relentlessly focused on product to one more focused on profit.
This new orientation was encapsulated by something that Harry Stonecipher, who had been CEO of McDonnell Douglas and was CEO of Boeing from 2003 to 2005, said: “When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so that it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm.”
Corporate culture can be a notoriously squishy topic—too readily subject to broad generalizations. And, of course, all big companies are interested in making money and boosting their stock price. But even if corporate cultures are hard to characterize accurately, they’re still real. As the management theorist Edgar Schein defined it, the essence of corporate culture is “the learned, shared, tacit assumptions on which people base their daily behavior.” In the old Boeing, the people who dictated those assumptions were the engineers. In the post-merger Boeing, the people who did so were more likely to be accountan
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