The Root of all Evil : The God Delusion
POSTED BY: Calhoun
UPDATED: Thursday, December 17, 2015 06:12
VIEWED: 49488
PAGE 28 of 32
Quote:Scientifically, it comes down to one’s assumption of the likelihood of a discontinuity or confidence in the rate of change in state. If you perceive the likelihood of these things as being small, then it becomes easier to extrapolate past trends into the future. We can often be confident in this assumption, but if we believe what Physics tells us, we can’t prove it since there is a fundamental limit on how accurate our initial measurements can be and that intrinsic error compounds with the extrapolation.
Originally posted by Causal:
Well, I don't know much about the scientific part of that, just the philosophical part. The problem of induction in a nutshell: what justifies us in making inferences about the future from experiences in the past? Curiously: nothing. It seems to work, but there's no way to justify it. Fascinating stuff.
Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil obscurius voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum.
Nothing is more unpredictable than the mob, nothing more obscure than public opinion, nothing more deceptive than the whole political system.
-- Cicero
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Actually, I'm thinking something much simpler. Say, for instance, that over the course of a year, I notice that whenever dark clouds arrive, rain comes right after them. The next time I see dark clouds, I will expect there to be rain. But what justifies my expectation of future rain from my experience of past rain? Nothing, really. And any attempt to justify that inference is going to beg the question.
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- Grand High Poobah of the Mythical Land of Iowa, and Keeper of State Secrets
- Captain, FFF.net Grammar Police
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Quote:That’s what I’m talking about too. We can assume that following dark clouds there will be rain, if past trends have indicated it. It’s a fair assumption, but proving it introduces some complications at a fundamental level, because we can’t define the system complete enough to prove it. In a classical sense, the task might be impossible in its shear magnitude, but not against any law or theory of physics. But in a non-classical sense it becomes fundamentally impossible, since there is an intrinsic uncertainty in the universe. You can never measure the initial state precisely enough.
Originally posted by Causal:
Actually, I'm thinking something much simpler. Say, for instance, that over the course of a year, I notice that whenever dark clouds arrive, rain comes right after them. The next time I see dark clouds, I will expect there to be rain. But what justifies my expectation of future rain from my experience of past rain? Nothing, really. And any attempt to justify that inference is going to beg the question.
Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil obscurius voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum.
Nothing is more unpredictable than the mob, nothing more obscure than public opinion, nothing more deceptive than the whole political system.
-- Cicero
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Quote:
Originally posted by Causal:
Well, I don't know much about the scientific part of that, just the philosophical part. The problem of induction in a nutshell: what justifies us in making inferences about the future from experiences in the past? Curiously: nothing. It seems to work, but there's no way to justify it. Fascinating stuff.
The really great thing about science, philosophically and scientifically speaking, is that inferences made about the future based on the past transcend the question of the true nature of it's truth at the very moment it proves true. Follow that okay?
In other words, truth in science works on a range. A scientific principle may be usefull on a micro level but once the lens is focused on a larger scale the same principles prove past their threshhold of usefullness...and vice versa. Macro principles, such as relativity fail to predict micro or quantom phenomena. However we don't throw out either theories because of what they lack, because the moments in which they accurately predict real events (both heretofore seen and unseen) are so compelling and usefull...it begs the question why we need to have a foundational reason to explain why they exist in the first place.
And oh those heretofore unseen predicted moments when they become seen for the first time...it's downright miraculous. Take the discoveries of Boise-Einstein "hourglass-eye" galaxies...time distortion due to relative speed...the existence of anti-matter...the expansion of the galaxy due to red-shift...manned flight. Excuse me if this sounds (or is) blasphemous but ladies and gentlemen, who needs god...we are gods!
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I think we're actually talking about two very different things. You seem to be talking about the fundamental properties of the universe (which I confess, I'm ill-equipped to discuss with you). I'm talking about inference from past experience. But we're not screaming at each other, so hurray! 
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- Grand High Poobah of the Mythical Land of Iowa, and Keeper of State Secrets
- Captain, FFF.net Grammar Police
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Quote:Well, maybe I just don’t understand what you’re trying to say, but it doesn’t seem like two different things to me. Why can’t we prove that an inference from a past experience is true? If we know that every time a rain cloud appears rain will follow, then it stands to reason that if a rain cloud appears tomorrow, rain will follow. So what prevents us from proving that rain follows rain clouds?
Originally posted by Causal:
I think we're actually talking about two very different things. You seem to be talking about the fundamental properties of the universe (which I confess, I'm ill-equipped to discuss with you). I'm talking about inference from past experience. But we're not screaming at each other, so hurray!
Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil obscurius voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum.
Nothing is more unpredictable than the mob, nothing more obscure than public opinion, nothing more deceptive than the whole political system.
-- Cicero
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Short answer: because any attempt to prove it will turn out to be viciously circular--that is, it will beg the question. A prime example of question begging is as follows:
1) I know that God exists because the Bible says so
2) I know that the Bible is reliable because God never lies.
Close examination of (2) (which is supposed to provide support for 1) reveals that (2) won't work unless we assume that (1) is true. But (1) is the proposition we are supposed to be proving! (For more info: http://www.fallacyfiles.org/begquest.html)
Inductive inference (in its most basic form) is of the type that I used with the clouds and rain example. Suppose that at time 1 (T1) you observe clouds of type X followed by rain of type Y. The very next time you see X, you're probably not going to assume Y--after all, you've only got one experience with X->Y, so you're not ready to make that assumption yet. But after a dozen or so instances of observing X and then Y following after X, you'll start to expect Y every time X appears. But what justifies a person in making such an inference? Most philosophers think nothing does. The principle under question is whether or not we can be justified in making inferences about the future based on observations of the past. The most common way of trying to justify inductive inference is to say, "Well, inductive inference has always been reliable; so we can be justified in making inductive inferences." But look carefully at that statement. You'll find that the it assumes that because something has been observable in the past (namely, inductive inference) we can be justified in making an inference about the future (namely, that inductive inference will continue to be reliable. But that assumption is the very principle under question! And that's begging the question. 
So how can we be justified in inductive inference? This is, of course, a very old philosophical question (check out David Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section IV, if you're really enterprising). A number of solutions have been advanced (among them Popper's attempt to understand all reasoning as deductive reasoning), but they aren't very satisfying. So the basic question remains: how can one justify the idea that the future will resemble the past (such that we are able to make inferences about future events from past experience). There really isn't any way. But it works, and we continue to do so, even though we can't prove that it does.
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- Grand High Poobah of the Mythical Land of Iowa, and Keeper of State Secrets
- Captain, FFF.net Grammar Police
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Yeah. That’s a good answer. It’s not the answer I would have given, but probably a better one.
Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil obscurius voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum.
Nothing is more unpredictable than the mob, nothing more obscure than public opinion, nothing more deceptive than the whole political system.
-- Cicero
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Quote:
Originally posted by Causal:
Well, I don't know much about the scientific part of that, just the philosophical part. The problem of induction in a nutshell: what justifies us in making inferences about the future from experiences in the past? Curiously: nothing. It seems to work, but there's no way to justify it. Fascinating stuff.
K, I think I've figured out why you annoy us 'scientist' guys so much (though it usually, for me, only lasts as long as it takes my feable brain to understand what you really mean, then my irritation is past). It's mostly language.
I will agree that much of science is making inferences about the future, from experiences in the past; in fact it is the core of science. But we differ; I do feel we have a justification... that justification is 'it works'. Now, is that a 'logically sustainable' justification, probably not. It is an 'experiential' justification (justified based on experience). (ok, maybe that isn't a word; but I'm desperately hoping you know what I mean because I'm not finding one ;-) ).
And here's where you annoy the scientists... when you call an 'assumption' a 'belief'. The thing is the scientist does not 'believe' the assumption, he uses it. The assumption may be wrong; and a good scientist clearly labels his assumption until such time as he can fill it in with a better thing; preferably something with tons of logic behind it.
Take as an example the "Uniformity Principle". A scientist will not say he 'believes' in it; it is an assumption. For instance, lets say we want to predict how long it takes a light beam to travel from ... oh, the opposite side of the galaxy to "over here". Problem: We can only measure the speed of light in a vaccuum here. Hmm, what's the speed of light over yonder on the other side of the galaxy? No idea... problem. So... what now. Let's try something, let's assume the speed of the light is the same "over yonder", mark said assumption as covered by 'uniformity priniciple' and see if works. Seems to! Ok, well, that's some evidence that the 'uniformity principle' applies; so we'll use that until we learn better.
So, does the poor, confused scientist -believe- that the speed of light is the same over yonder? No; he wouldn't be terribly shocked if it turns out it is .0001% slower over yonder, and the poor shlock has to re-calculate everything. The question is, was he able to get some meaningful (read useful) results in the mean time; in most cases, was the margin of error introduced by the assumption smaller than, say, the margin of error of various measurements? Often, very many times, this is the case. In the above example, if the result of the measurements only were "good" to provide times +/- .02%, the introduced error of .0001% was "insignificant" to the end answer (and would have been rounded off, and assuming all the things I "speculated on for purposes of discussion are 'accurate')). Sometimes it turns out that the assumptions are incorrect to the degree that it -does- affect the 'end answer' beyond the point of insiginficance, and the rocket ends up in the Atlantic Ocean instead of nicely plopped up on Mars or whereever the thing was supposed to go.
However, if it is simpler for you to say that "LeadB believes in the 'uniformity principle'", I'm content to let you say it. If my 'scientist friends' hear you and look at me funny, I'll simply tell them I understand it's just an assumption, and they will be happy with me again ;-), and I can stay in the Geek Club.
**** Please note: I am -not- predicting that light actually travels slower in the far reaches of the universe, it was merely provided as a possible example of how the universe often refuses to nicely sit it's indicated boxes (I know Causal gets this fact and doesn't need the note, but I suspect someone out there will grab that non-factoid and make hay out of it).
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Quote:
Originally posted by Causal:
Short answer: because any attempt to prove it will turn out to be viciously circular--that is, it will beg the question. A prime example of question begging is as follows:
[and etc]
Heh, we were simo composing; if I had seen this post, I might not have bothered. I do appreciate your post here tho, it clarifies that I was correct in stating it is not "logically" justified, but "experientially" justified. I think we are on the same page, we just tend to use different language; or sadly, the same language to mean different things. Isn't it amazing how much trouble 'jargon' can get you into?
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